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This paper uses the example of an exam to model multi-dimensional search under a deadline. When
the dimension is two, an order-invariance property allows simple characterization of the optimal
search policy. Behavior is shown to be highly sensitive to changes in the deadline, and a wide variety
of policies can be rationalized (as being optimal) as the length of the deadline increases. This is
contrasted with behavior under the traditional case of geometric discounting, in which a similar
sensitivity to changes in the discount factor cannot hold. For dimensions higher than two, the
invariance principle does not hold; this increases complexity of the problem of ﬁnding the optimal
search policy.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The pressure of a deadline is encountered in many situations. Often such deadlines are externally
imposed, or are the result of a credible commitment that one has made. Graduate students aim to
ﬁnish their thesis before ﬁnancial support runs out; governments seek to maximize their ‘achieve-
ments’ by the end of their electoral term; ﬁrms’ research strategies are often inﬂuenced by the
deadlines before patents expire. While the economic importance of deadlines is obvious, its exact
impact has been relatively little studied.
In this paper we study the eﬀect of deadlines on economic processes that involve multi-dimensional
search. While searches with an inﬁnite (or indeﬁnite) horizon have inspired an impressive literature
both within and beyond economics, it is perhaps easy to believe that ﬁnite horizon search problems
oﬀer little intellectual challenge or economic insight. We show that, to the contrary, the nature
and length of the deadline can have strong and possibly counter-intuitive eﬀects on the process and
optimal strategy of the search.
A good paradigm for many decision situations under deadlines is one that most individuals
have faced at some time or the other, namely, when taking an exam: credit is only awarded for
completing correct answers within the stipulated time; after the time limit on the exam is past, the
value from a correct answer diminishes to zero. When two or more questions are involved and one
is unsure of one’s chance of success on the various questions, the existence of such a deadline will
aﬀect behavior with respect to the attempts that one makes on each question, and consequently
on the outcome. In this paper, we seek to explore the behavioral eﬀects of deadlines in decision
problems involving multiple time-consuming projects, with uncertainty regarding the chance of
success in each.
We model the situation as a multi-dimensional search problem: there are several questions, each
with a possible set of answers. Although the candidate is aware of this set, she is unsure which
one among them is the correct answer. This uncertainty could be either factual or logical; if it
stems from an uncertainty in knowledge such as “What is the currency of Russia – the ruble or
the peso?”, it maybe impossible to resolve the uncertainty within the atmosphere of the exam. If
however the uncertainty is logical, then time could be a useful resource in resolving it; for example,
in a mathematics exam, knowledge of the axioms of mathematics should, in principle, allow one
1to verify whether a given series of statements constitute a proof (or refutation) of the proposition
in question. In this paper, we assume that the uncertainty the candidate has over the possible
answers is logical, so that given enough time, she could arrive at the correct answer by veriﬁcation
and elimination. More precisely, we assume that in each period of time, it is possible for her to
verify whether or not a particular answer is the right one for the corresponding question. Points
are only awarded for arriving at the correct answer within the given deadline.
The candidate begins with some subjective beliefs about how likely it is for each of the possi-
bilities to be the correct answer. This sort of probabilistic judgement may be a reﬂection of her
preparation, expertise or experience. Given her subjective beliefs on the various sets of answers and
the given deadline, the optimal search policy for the candidate will consist of deciding at each point
of time, the question that she will attempt in the upcoming period, given her history of success or
failure up to that stage.
We begin by establishing that when there are only two questions, changing the order of attempts
on the two questions does not change the probability of ﬁnding the correct answer in either. Thus
for example, the following two policies have the same value: (i) “Start by attempting question A
once. If successful, use remaining time on B; if unsuccessful in the ﬁr s ta t t e m p to nA, then try B
until success.” (ii) “Attempt question B upto (and including) the last but one period. If successful
at any intermediate period, use remaining time on A; if not, then attempt question A (once) in the
last period.” This order-invariance property allows a simple characterization of the optimal policy
in the case of an exam with two questions. In most of the paper, we focus our analysis on this case.
In determining this optimal policy, the candidate trades oﬀ the immediate prospect of getting a
reward against the informational value from eliminating some suspects (and thereby increasing the
probability of future rewards). A simple example will illustrate the point: suppose there are two
questions A and B. Suppose on question A, the candidate has 5 possible answers among which she
is 99% sure that A1 is the correct one (with the remaining 1% equally distributed over the other
four possibilities). For question B, she has two suspects, each of which she considers to be 50%
likely. If she has only one period to use, she would obviously attempt question A, but facing an
exam of length T =2 , it is optimal for her to start by attempting B (and sticking to it if she fails).
The above example also shows, albeit in a rather trivial way, the eﬀect of the deadline in play in
2determining the optimal policy. More generally, we may attempt to answer the following question:
• What behavior can be rationalized as optimal under a deadline, with respect to any system
of subjective probabilities at all?
In this paper, we provide some partial answers. While it is not true that all sequences of policies
are rationalizable, we can do so for several broad classes of policies. As we see later, even given the
same system of beliefs, a wide variety of disparate behavior can be justiﬁed as being rational under
various sets of deadlines.
While the appearance of deadlines is a ubiquitous fact of life, one may also ask whether deadlines
could be interpreted as a particular form of discounting, namely, no discounting of payoﬀst i l lt h e
deadline and then inﬁnite discounting past it. The most widely used way of modelling impatience
in economics is to assume that agents have a constant rate of inter-temporal substitution, thus
giving rise to geometric discounting. Do deadlines and geometric discounting lead to similar sets
of behavior? More speciﬁcally, we formulate our search model as an inﬁnite-horizon geometric
discounting model, and ask:
• Is every search policy that is rationalizable under an unbounded sequence of deadlines also
rationalizable under a sequence of discount factors approaching unity?
In other words, is behavior under a long enough deadline similar to that without any deadline
but with a high enough discount factor? We consider this question in section 4. As we shall see, the
answer is negative. We ﬁnd that while it is possible to justify behavior that is very sensitive to a
change in the length of the deadline as being optimal, it is much more diﬃcult to generate a similar
sensitivity of optimal behavior to changes in the discount factor. Geometric discounting imparts
the property of analyticity to the diﬀerence in value functions between two diﬀerent policies; this
makes inﬁnite oscillation between them impossible. On the other hand, it is possible to rationalize
behavior that involves switching inﬁnitely often between such policies as “attempt question A until
success” and “attempt question B until success” depending only on the length of the deadline.
As mentioned earlier, in the case of only two questions, an order-invariance property exists
so that the value for any policy does not depend on the order of attempts on the two questions.
3This property does not hold for three questions or more. Furthermore, as we show via a counter-
example, the invariance property does not even hold for the optimal policy, thereby making its
characterization more complex in such cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we deﬁne the basic search model
under deadlines. Section 3 characterizes the optimal policy in the case of two questions. In section
4, we examine behavior that can be rationalized under deadlines versus that in an inﬁnite-horizon
geometric discounting framework. Section 5.1 presents a counter-example to show that the in-
variance property fails to hold in an exam involving more than two questions. In section 5.2, we
consider an extension to the basic model for which the order invariance property holds for any
number of questions, and we conclude by broadly discussing some possible applications.
2 A Search Model with Deadlines
2.1 Model of an Exam: the general problem
Consider an exam with n questions, A,B,C,.... For each question, the candidate has a list of
possible answers {A1,A 2,...},{B1,B 2,...}, etc. Each list contains exactly one correct answer to the
question and the lists are mutually exclusive: thus for example, A4 cannot be the right answer to
both questions A and B. These facts are known to the candidate.
The candidate’s subjective probability on Ai being the correct answer to question A is denoted
by ai. Therefore ai ≥ 0 and
P
i ai =1 . Likewise for the other questions, we adopt the convention
of denoting subjective probabilities on the answers by the corresponding lower-case letter. The
probability distributions a,b,... are assumed to be mutually independent; thus failure or success
on one question does not provide any new information about the other questions. As discussed in
the Introduction, this formulation is intended to capture uncertainty which is “logical” in nature
and may be resolved over time by veriﬁcation and elimination.
The duration of the exam consists of T periods of time. In each period, the candidate is able to
pick exactly one question (say B) and verify whether a particular possibility (say B4) is the correct
answer for that question. α marks are awarded to the candidate if she gets the right answer for
question A within the stipulated time, β marks for B, and so forth. The candidate’s objective is
4to maximize the expected number of marks in the exam.1
Facing the deadline, upon deciding to attempt a particular question in the upcoming period,
the candidate will clearly pick to verify the most likely possibility from the list of (remaining)
answers to that question. Therefore, without loss of generality we may relabel the possible answers
to a question such that the corresponding subjective probabilities are in non-increasing order i.e.
ai ≥ ai+1 etc. If the candidate succeeds with her choice, she then shifts her focus to the remaining
unanswered questions; if she does not succeed, she updates her belief on the question that she has
just attempted. For example, if she has tried question B for the ﬁrst k periods and not found the
correct answer, then her subjective probability on B is updated, with support on {Bk+1,B k+2,...}
and the corresponding probabilities given by bk+j/(1 −
Pk
i=1 bi),j=1 ,2,.....
Although this model is reminiscent of ‘multi-armed bandit’ problems (see Gittins 1989), there
a r et w oi m p o r t a n td i ﬀerences: (i) in contrast to the ﬁnite deadlines in our model, the time horizon
in the bandit problems is typically inﬁnite, and (ii) in the typical bandit problem, ﬂow payoﬀsa r e
realized at every period, as opposed to the one-shot nature of the payoﬀs in our model. As we shall
see below, this makes the analysis in the two problems signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
2.2 An Equivalent Formulation in terms of Hazard Rates
For future analysis, it is convenient to reformulate the model in terms of the hazard rates on the




(1 − a1 − ..... − ai−1)
i =1 ,2,..... (1)
This is the probability that Ai is the correct answer for question A, conditioned on the event that
A1,A 2,...A i−1 are not. Thus, if the candidate has failed to ﬁnd the right answer to question A
among the ﬁrst i−1 possibilities, then her subjective belief on Ai being the correct one is given by
hA
i . The hazard rates for the other questions are similarly deﬁned. We adopt the convention that
if a1 + ..... + ai−1 =1 , then deﬁne hA
i =0 .
For future reference, it may be also useful to note the reciprocal relation:
ai =( 1− hA
1 )(1 − hA







1As we show in section 5.2, the analysis is isomorphic if the candidate is interested in correctly answering only
one of two equally weighted questions.
5where gA
i is deﬁned as gA
i =1− hA





3 The Case of Two Questions
In this section, we consider the problem when the candidate faces only two questions. In this case,
a policy needs to only determine the sequence to be followed when none of the questions have been
answered correctly. In the event of a success, the follow-up policy is trivial, namely, use the residual
time to attempt the remaining (unanswered) question. As we show later, this makes analysis of
the optimal policy in the case of two questions much simpler than that for a higher number of
questions.
3.1 An Invariance Principle






i ∈ {A,B}. This is understood to mean the following: if the candidate
has failed to ﬁnd the right answer to either question prior to period t, then she will attempt Q
(t)
i
in that period. On failure, she continues with this policy (i.e. attempts Q
(t+1)
i in period t +1 ); if
she succeeds, she only attempts the remaining question in the residual time.
We begin by showing that in the case of two questions, the particular order in which the
questions are attempted does not matter: the value of a policy is determined only by the number
of attempts on each question. For example, if the deadline is say T =5 , both policies BABAA and
AAABB would yield the same value.
Proposition 1 (Invariance Principle) In an exam with two questions A and B, all policies that
contain the same number of attempts on A have the same value.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of the invariance principle can be seen from ﬁgure 1. In the ﬁgure, the x- and y-axes
denote the number of attempts on questions A and B respectively, while the dark and dashed lines
denote policies AABAABBA and AABAABAB respectively (with a deadline of T =8 ) .B o t h
have the same number of attempts on both questions (5 on question A and 3 on B), but diﬀer in








value =  +
e.g. the true pair of answers (A3 , B6)
Figure 1: The Invariance Principle
region i+j ≤ T , then either of the above two policies would lead to success in both questions and
realize the value α +β. Likewise, if the pair of true answers lie in the region i>5 and j>3,t h e n
neither policy will lead to success in either question and so the realized value from both policies is
0. Finally, suppose i ≤ 5 w h i l et h a tf o rB is Bj with j>T− i; now, pursuing either policy leads
to success in A but failure in B and the realized value is α. Similarly, both policies realize the
value β when j ≤ 3 and i>T−j. This means that the policies AABAABBA and AABAABAB,
which have the same number of attempts on questions A and B, produce the same outcome, and
a fortiori the same value, in every possible state (Ai,B j).
This invariance principle greatly simpliﬁes the problem of determining the optimal policy in the
case of two questions: one requires to only determine the optimal number of attempts on one of the
questions, not their order. So, from now on, we will generally refer to a policy only by the number
of attempts on question A. L e tu sd e n o t eb yV (m) the value from pursuing a policy involving m





















The value function consists of two parts: [α + β
PT−i
j=1 bj] is the expected value conditioned on
having correctly answered A on the i-th attempt, and then using the remaining time to answer B;
7if the candidate does not succeed in answering A in the ﬁrst m attempts, then she switches to B,






i=1 ai)] is the expected value conditioned on getting B right on the j-th
attempt and then using the residual time to attempt A (with the updated probabilities).





















Thus this policy may uncover the correct answer to question A in two ways: ﬁrst, if this answer
lies within the ﬁrst m possibilities; if not, then it will be uncovered only if the candidate ﬁnds the
right answer to B a n dt h e nh a ss u ﬃcient time left to get to it. The marginal eﬀect of increasing
the number of attempts on question A from m to m+1is now clear: the gain on A is the increased
probability of uncovering Am+1, while the loss on B is the decreased chance of uncovering BT−m :
V (m +1 )− V (m)=α[am+1 − am+1
T−(m+1) X
j=1




The marginal eﬀects can be added up to obtain the global eﬀect of raising the number of
attempts on question A from 0 to m : V (m) − V (0) =
m−1 X
i=0






αai+1[1 − FB(T − m) −
T−(i+1) X
j=T−(m−1)










i=1 ai and FB(t)=
Pt
j=1 bj are the cumulative distributions for A and B respec-
tively. Therefore the optimal number of attempts on question A is the value of m that maximizes
the above expression.
When the weights on the two questions, α and β, are the same (and equal to 1), the expression
simpliﬁes to:
V (m) − V (0) = FA(m) − [FB(T) − FB(T − m)] − FA(m)FB(T − m) (5)
In the rest of the analysis, we will assume that the marks on both questions are equal i.e. α = β =1 .
We feel that putting unequal weights on the two questions complicates the problem without adding
much extra insight.
83.2 Characterization of Optimal Policies
In this section, we try to characterize properties of the optimal policy under certain probability
distributions. We begin with the case when the candidate is sure of one of the questions; the
following proposition shows that it is always optimal to attempt the “sure-shot”.
Proposition 2 In an exam with two equally weighted questions, if the candidate is sure of correctly
answering a question within the deadline, then attempting that question until she succeeds on it is
an optimal policy.
Proof. Suppose the candidate is sure of answering question A within the deadline i.e. FA(T)=
1. Then from (5), V (T) − V (0) = 1 − FB(T).
Since FA(m) and FB(T − m) are both non-negative and no greater than 1, it follows that:
V (m) − V (0) + FB(T)=FA(m)+FB(T − m) − FA(m)FB(T − m) ≤ 1
Hence for every m ≤ T we have, V (m)−V (0) ≤ 1−FB(T)=V (T)−V (0), i.e. attempting A until
s u c c e s si so p t i m a l .
The intuition for this result is simple. Suppose the true answer to question A is Ai and that for
B is Bj. When one of the questions, say A, is a “sure-shot” (i.e. can be surely answered within the
given deadline), then i ≤ T and the policy of “attempt A until success” uncovers it with probability
one. Any other policy P of the form “attempt Aktimes” does as well as the policy of focusing ﬁrst
on A if i + j ≤ T (in this case, all policies will uncover answers to both the questions). However,
if i +j exceeds T, then only one of the questions can be correctly answered. In this case, whereas,
the policy of focusing ﬁrst on A answers it correctly for sure, policy P may not have a sure shot
either at question A or question B.
This “sure-shot” principle can lead to situations that may seem non-intuitive at ﬁrst glance.
Consider the example in the Introduction: in an exam with two periods, the candidate has 5
possibilities for question A, among which she is 99% sure that A1 is the correct answer (with the
remaining 1% equally distributed over the other four possibilities). For question B, she has two
suspects, both of which she considers equally likely. Although there is the possibility A1 with a
99% chance of success, it is optimal for her to start by attempting B (and sticking to it if she fails),
9since she is sure of getting it correct within the deadline. This example also shows the eﬀect of the
deadline in play (albeit in a trivial way) in determining the optimal policy: if the deadline was of
o n ep e r i o do n l y ,s h ew o u l da t t e m p tq u e s t i o nA; but with a deadline of two periods, she attempts
B until success.
The following proposition characterizes optimal policies in the case of monotonic hazard rates.
Proposition 3 Assume that in an exam with two equally weighted questions, the candidate is not
sure of being able to answer either question correctly within the deadline, i.e. FA(T) < 1 and
FB(T) < 1.
(i) Suppose the hazard rates on both questions are non-decreasing at all points i.e. for k ∈ {A,B},
hk
m+1 ≥ hk
m for m =1 ,...,T− 1.N o w ,i fFA(T) ≥ FB(T), then “attempting A until success” is an
optimal policy; if not, then “attempting B until success” is an optimal policy.
(ii) Suppose the hazard rates on both questions are decreasing at all points. Then any optimal




1 . If hA
1 ≤ hB
T ,
then zero attempts on A is an optimal policy; if hA
T ≥ hB
1 , then zero attempts on B is optimal.









Proof. Using (4), we can write the marginal eﬀect of increasing the number of attempts on A:
V (m +1 )− V (m)=[ 1− FA(m)][1 − FB(T − m − 1)](hA
m+1 − hB
T−m) (6)
Thus the sign of V (m +1 )− V (m) depends on whether hA
m+1 ≷ hB
T−m.
(i) If the hazard rates on both questions are non-decreasing, hA
m+1 −hB
T−m is non-decreasing in
m. Hence, either V (m+1)−V (m) > 0 for all m, or it is negative for all m, or it is initially negative
and then changes sign somewhere in the middle. Thus, in this case, the optimal policy will involve
either 0 or T attempts on question A. From (5), V (T) − V (0) = FA(T) − FB(T). Thus, according
as FA(T) ≷ FB(T), “all A”o r“ a l lB’i so p t i m a l .
(ii) If the hazard rates on both questions are decreasing, the sign of hA
m+1 − hB
T−m is non-
increasing in m. Now, if hA
1 ≤ hB
T , then V (1) − V (0) ≤ 0. This implies that V (m +1 )− V (m) ≤ 0
for all m; therefore, in that case, the optimal policy consists of 0 attempts on question A. Similarly,
if hA
T ≥ hB
1 ,V(m +1 )− V (m) ≥ 0 for all m, and the optimal policy consists of T attempts on A.
10If neither of these two conditions holds, then V (m +1 )− V (m) must change sign for some m in
between 0 and T. Then the optimal policy will be given by one of the m’s for which it does so.







i . Thus (5) can be written as:


















i=1 (1 − hB
i ).
The above proposition thus characterizes optimal policies in the case where hazard rates on both
questions are either increasing or decreasing. In the case of increasing hazard rates, the intuition
for a corner-solution is quite clear: if one starts with say question A, then a failure in the attempt
only makes the distribution on A more attractive. Thus in this case, if one starts with A, one
continues with it in the case of failure.2
Part (iii) of the above proposition illustrates an important issue in determination of the optimal
policy. It shows that, in general, the entire distribution for each question matters. Suppose, there
is a ‘gem’ hidden somewhere in the distribution i.e. a possibility with a very high hazard rate, then
one may be willing to go through some ‘dirt’ (i.e. some low hazard rates) to reach it. Thus, without
monotonicity in the hazard rates for the two questions, the objective function is not necessarily
concave or convex and therefore the local maxima need not be global. Further both questions matter
(see also footnote 2); in contrast to the standard “bandit problem”, the value of each question (or
“arm”) cannot be computed independently of the other arm.
4 Behavior under Deadline versus Discounting
In this section, we begin by examining the type of policies that can be rationalized under deadlines.
The speciﬁc question we ask is that given a sequence of deadlines and associated search policies, are
these policies justiﬁable as being optimal under some set of beliefs on the two projects? Of course,
if both sets of answers, A and B, have the same constant hazard-rate, then (from the previous









2 =0 .7, then the optimal policy is A1B1; i.e. even if one starts with A, it is optimal to
shift to B in the event of failure.
11section) all policies give the same value and are trivially rationalizable. Hence, for rationalizability,
we require the prescribed policies to be strictly optimal.
4.1 Rationalizability of Behavior in the Deadline Model
Recall that in the case of two questions, a policy can be characterized solely by the number of
attempts on either question. For a deadline T, let us denote by fA(T) the number of attempts on
question A. Given a function fA(T), we seek to determine if there exists a set of beliefs on questions
A and B, such that the unique optimal policy under a deadline T consists of fA(T) attempts on
question A.
We provide a partial answer to the question by rationalizing a wide class of policies: (i) policies
in which the candidate either attempts only one question or the other depending on the deadline
i.e. functions of the form fA(T) ∈ {0,T},a n d(ii) policies in which the number of attempts on
both questions are non-decreasing in the length of the deadline i.e. functions with the property
that both fA(T) and fB(T)=T− fA(T) are non-decreasing in T. The proof is constructive in
both cases: for a given function fA, we construct probability distributions on the two questions
by constructing the corresponding g-functions (gk(t)=1− hk
t,k= A,B) to support fA(T) as the
unique optimal policy for a deadline of T periods.
Proposition 4 Suppose fA(T) ∈ {0,T} for all T =1 ,2,... .T h e nfA is rationalizable.
Proof. See Appendix.
Although the proof explicitly constructs a system of beliefs to justify any behavioral function
fA(T) of the above form as being optimal, it maybe instructive to study the constructed probabilities
in the case of extreme oscillation: say, the optimal policy when the deadline is odd (i.e. for
T =1 ,3,5,...) is to “attempt A until success”, and when the deadline is even is to “attempt B
until success”. The following sequence of g-functions will rationalize this behavior as being optimal:
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
gA
t s2 (1 +  )s3 s6 (1 +  )s7 s10 (1 +  )s11 s14
gB
t s s4 (1 +  )s5 s8 (1 +  )s9 s12 (1 +  )s13
where it is assumed that s ∈ (0,1/2),ε>0 and (1 + ε)s<1/2.
12Since the hazard rates on both questions are increasing, in this case the optimal policy (from







i , w es e et h a tt h er a t i oi ss<1 when T is odd; hence with an odd
deadline, it is optimal to try only question A. When T is even, this ratio is 1+ε,t h u sj u s t i f y i n g
the policy of attempting only B for such deadlines.
Next, we rationalize the class of policies in which the number of attempts on either question
does not decrease with an increase in the deadline T.
Proposition 5 Suppose fA(T) and T − fA(T) are both non-decreasing in T. Then fA is rational-
izable.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof itself is constructive, and it may be useful to see the construction for a particular
function fA(T). Suppose we wish to rationalize the policy “attempt A half the time (rounded to
the nearest higher integer)”; thus, in this case, the fA function (up to T =8 )is as follows:
T 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
fA(T) 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
The following g-functions on A and B rationalize this behavior:
{gA
1 = x1,g A
2 = x3,g A
3 = x5,g A
4 = x7,....}
{gB
1 = x2,g B
2 = x4,g B
3 = x6,g B
4 = x8, .....}
where {xn}n∈N is given by the increasing sequence xn = s −  n with 0 < <1
2 and   + 1
2 <s<1.






i . Since xn is an increasing sequence, when the deadline is T =7for example, to
minimize the product of the g-functions, we include gA
1 = x1,g B
1 = x2,g A
2 = x3,...,gB
3 = x6, and
gA
4 = x7, but not gB
4 = x8 which exceeds gA
4 . Thus for T =7 , it is optimal to attempt question
A exactly four times. Essentially, the above program takes an increasing sequence {xn}n∈N and
distributes it sequentially between the two questions depending on whether at each stage an increase
in the deadline calls for an increase (by one) in the number of attempts on A or B.
13Although we have thus been able to rationalize a wide class of policies, not all sequences of
behavior are justiﬁable as being optimal under any set of beliefs on the two questions. For example,
it can be shown that if fA(s)=s and fA(t)=0 , then fA(s+t) 6= t. In other words, if it is optimal
to try question Astimes when the deadline is s and to try question Bttimes when the deadline is
t, then it cannot be optimal to attempt Attimes and Bstimes when the deadline is s+t; in such
a situation, the policy of attempting Astimes (and Bttimes) does better.3 Hence the question
of what is the precise set of policies that are rationalizable under deadlines remains open.
However, as we show below, even this limited set of rationalizable policies under deadlines
cannot be justiﬁed as being optimal under traditional geometric discounting.
4.2 Rationalizability of Behavior in a Model of Geometric Discounting
In the previous section, we have shown that several forms of sensitivity of behavior to changes
in deadlines can be justiﬁed as being optimal under suitable distributions of beliefs on the two
questions. Now, one may also view deadlines as a special form of discounting: no discounting till
the deadline and complete discounting after it. Suppose instead one were to consider the same
problem of two-dimensional search, but with an inﬁnite deadline and in which the present value of
obtaining a reward in the (t +1 ) - t hp e r i o di sg i v e nb yδt (δ<1). In this more standard inﬁnite-
horizon geometric discounting framework, can a similar sensitivity of behavior to changes in the
discount factor δ be also rationalized? Are changes in the discount factor behaviorally similar to
changes in the deadline? Following in the spirit of the previous section, here we ask that given a
set of prescribed policies, does there exist a sequence of discount factors {δk} going to unity for
which the given policies are optimal?
Extreme oscillatory behavior, such as attempting only question A if the deadline is odd and
attempting only B if the deadline is even was shown to be rationalizable in the case of deadlines.
Under geometric discounting, we examine whether it is possible for the optimal policy to display
this extreme form of sensitivity to slight changes in the discount factor. As the next proposition
shows, the answer is negative.









































i = V (t) − V (0) i.e. the policy of attempting Attimes is inoptimal.
14For brevity, we will refer to the policies “attempt A until success” and “attempt B until success”
in the model of geometric discounting as the “all A” and “all B” policies respectively.
Proposition 6 In the model with geometric discounting, for any given distribution of beliefs on
A and B, there do not exist two sequences of discount factors going to unity such that for one
sequence, the strictly optimal policy is “all A” while for the other sequence, the strictly optimal
policy is “all B”.
Proof. Let us deﬁne Ai(δ)=
(ai+1+δai+2+δ2ai+3+......)
(ai+1+ai+2+ai+3+......) . In the event that question B has been
successfully answered, and i unsuccessful attempts have been made on question A, this then gives
the discounted value of the (updated) distribution A. Similarly, Bi(δ)=
(bi+1+δbi+2+δ2bi+3+......)
(bi+1+bi+2+bi+3+......) .
The overall value from following the “all A” policy is given by:
VA(δ)=a1(1 + δB0(δ)) + δ(1 − a1){
a2
1 − a1
(1 + δB0(δ)) + .....
= A0(δ)(1 + δB0(δ))
Similarly, the value from following “all B”i sg i v e nb y : VB(δ)=B0(δ)(1 + δA0(δ)).
We do the proof by contradiction. Suppose there exist two sequences of discount factors going
to unity such that “all A” is strictly optimal for one sequence and “all B” for the other.
For this conjecture to hold, VA(δ) − VB(δ) must have an inﬁnite number of roots δ in some
open interval (δ∗,1]. By theorem (see for example Shilov (1973)), an analytic function cannot have
an inﬁnite number of roots, unless it is the constant zero function. We establish contradiction by
showing that if “all A”a n d“ a l lB” are optimal along two sequences of discount factors going to
unity, then the function VA(δ)−VB(δ) must be analytic at 1 and hence must be the zero function;
but then “all A” (or “all B”) cannot be strictly optimal.
The proof is in two steps. We ﬁrst show that if liminfn hA
n =0(liminfn hB
n =0respectively),
then “all A” (“all B” resp.) cannot be optimal for any sequence of discount factors going to unity,
i.e. if the distribution on A becomes suﬃciently pessimistic after some stage, it cannot be optimal
to ignore B after that. We then show that if liminfn hA
n > 0 and liminfn hB
n > 0, then the function
VA(δ) − VB(δ) must be analytic at 1, and thus cannot oscillate inﬁnitely often.
Step 1: Suppose liminfn hA
n =0 . Then the policy “all A” cannot be optimal along a sequence of
discount factors going to 1.
15Proof : We will use the following claim in our proof.
Claim: Consider a sequence of discount factors {δk} g o i n gt ou n i t y( δk < 1) along which “all
A” is the optimum policy. Then b1EAn(T) ≤ 1 for all n, where EAn(T) is the expected time to
success in question A using the “all A” policy, after having failed at it n times.
P r o o fo fc l a i m : Let us denote the updated probabilities on (the remaining suspects in) A after





1−FA(n). Now, the payoﬀ from following an “all A”p o l i c yf r o m
this stage onwards is V n
A(δ)=An(δ)(1 + δB0(δ)). Note that, question B has not been attempted
so far and so the probability distribution on it is unchanged.
Consider the alternative policy “once B a n dt h e na l lA”. The value from this policy is:
Wn(δ)=b1(1 + δAn(δ)) + δ(1 − b1)An(δ)(1 + δB1(δ))
= b1 + δ(1 − b1)An(δ)+δAn(δ)B0(δ)
Now, for “all A” to be optimal, we require that V n
A(δ)−Wn(δ) > 0 for all n, for all δ along the
sequence {δk}. Let us denote by f(δ)=V n







3 + ....)b1 − (1 − b1)
= b1EAn(T) − 1
Note that f(1) = 0, since at δ =1both policies give the same value. Thus, for “all A”t ob e
optimal along the sequence {δk} → 1, we require that limδ−→1−
d
dδf(δ) ≤ 0, i.e. that b1EAn(T) ≤ 1.
¤
Continuing with the proof of step 1, let us now compute the expected time of success in question

















+ ..... + m
an+m
1 − FA(n)







= m +1− [m
an+1
1 − FA(n)

















n+1 for all i>1.
Since the above inequality holds for all m, choose m large enough so that mb1 > 1; then choose




n =0 , there exists a p such that hA
p+1 <ε .





2 ε>m .Hence, b1EAp(T) >
b1m>1. Thus if liminfn hA
n =0 , then from the above claim, “all A” cannot be optimal after p
failures on A.
Similarly for “all B” to be optimal, we require that liminfn hB
n > 0. ¤
Step 2: If liminfn hA
n > 0 and liminfn hB
n > 0,then the function VA(δ)−VB(δ)=
P∞
i=1 δi−1(ai−bi)
must be analytic at 1.
Proof : Suppose liminfn hA
n = λ>0. Take an ε>0 such that η = λ−ε>0. Then, by deﬁnition,
there exists M such that for all n>M ,h A
n >η .
Now from (2), an+1 =( 1− hA
1 )(1 − hA
2 ).....(1 − hA
n)hA
n+1.
Therefore, for all n>M ,a n+1 <K (1 − η)n−M where K is a positive constant.
Thus |an+1|
1/n < (1 − η){ K
(1−η)M }1/n. Hence limsupn |an+1|
1/n < 1, which is the condition for
P∞
i=1 δi−1ai to be analytic at 1.
Similarly, if liminfn hB
n > 0, then
P∞
i=1 δi−1bi is analytic at 1.
This then establishes analyticity of VA(δ) − VB(δ). ¤
From the discussion at the start, this then completes the proof of the proposition.
It may be useful to see why the construction (in proposition 4) that was used for rationalizing
extreme oscillation in the case of deadlines does not work for geometric discounting. The probabil-
ities there for rationalizing “all A” for odd deadlines and “all B” for even deadlines can be shown
to have the following general form for n>2:
an =( 1 − s2n)s(n−1)(2n−1)/2(1 + ε)(n−1)/2 if n is odd
=( 1 − (1 + ε)s2n−1)s(2n2−3n+2)/2(1 + ε)(n−2)/2 if n is even
bn =( 1 − (1 + ε)s2n−1)s(2n2−3n+1)/2(1 + ε)(n−3)/2 if n is odd
=( 1 − s2n)s(2n2−3n)/2(1 + ε)(n−2)/2 if n is even
17Here, an −bn contains terms in which the exponent on s is of a higher power than n. Hence, in
this case an −bn goes to zero at a rate faster than 1/n. This makes the diﬀerence VA(δ)−VB(δ)=
P∞
i=1 δi−1(ai−bi) from following policies “all A” and “all B”a n a l y t i ca t1. Such a function cannot
oscillate inﬁnitely often near 1, thereby ruling out extreme oscillation in the optimal policy with
geometric discounting.
Although the above proposition considers only the particular policies “all A” and “all B”, the
logic of the proof can be used to rule out inﬁnite oscillations between any ﬁnite set of policies
provided that liminfn hA
n > 0 and liminfn hB
n > 0. The diﬀerence in value between any two policies
can be written as a polynomial (possibly of inﬁnite degree) in the discount factor δ,a n ds t e p2o f
the above proof can then be used to show that this diﬀerence is analytic at 1 (under the condition
that hA
n and hB
n are both bounded away from 0). This implies that for a range of δ close to 1, either
one policy always does better than the other or both give the same value. Comparing among a
ﬁnite set of policies, this implies that for any set of beliefs with liminfn hA
n > 0 and liminfn hB
n > 0,
there exists a δ∗ close to unity such that for all δ ∈ (δ∗,1] the set of best policies (among this ﬁnite
set) is the same.
Thus, even comparing the case of a very long deadline with that of geometric discounting with
discount factors close to unity, we see that there is much less variation in behavior due to changes
in the discount factor than due to changes in the deadline.
5 Additional Considerations
5.1 Three or More Questions: Breakdown of the Invariance Principle
In the case of two questions, the order-invariance property allowed a simple characterization of the
optimal policy only in terms of the number of attempts on each question. The invariance principle
does not hold when the number of questions is greater than two. It is easy to show that in such
cases not all policies are order-invariant. More importantly, even the optimal policy need not be
order-invariant. We illustrate this by means of an example.
Example 1 Consider an exam with 3 questions A, B and C, and a deadline of 5 periods. The




















Figure 2: Optimal policy for Example 1. On success, go left; on failure, go right.
rates in the following table:
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
A 0.15 0.17 0.20 .01 0.01
B 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.01
C 0.225 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.01
The marks on all three questions are assumed to be equal to 1.
Here, a policy can be described as a sequence of the following form ((Qt
i,Et))5
t=1. This is under-
stood to mean the following: if the candidate has failed in all her attempts prior to a given time t,
then she will attempt Qt
i in the current period. If she fails in this attempt too, she will move on to
Qt+1
i in the next period. But if she succeeds (in verifying that Qi is the correct answer to Q),s h e
will then pursue the policy Et that is optimal for the remaining unanswered question(s), with the
updated probabilities and in the remaining time. Et involves at most two questions and is deﬁned
as in the previous sections.
In this example it can be shown that the following is an optimal policy:
Popt ≡ ((C1,E1),(B1,E2),(C2,E3),(B2,E4),(B3,E5))
with E1 =( B1,A 1,A 2,A 3) E2 =( A1,A 2,A 3)




















Figure 3: Alternative (with the order of attempts changed) to optimal policy in Example 1. On
success, go left; on failure, go right.
This policy is shown in ﬁgure 2. The value from following this policy is 0.92495.
This is however not the unique optimal policy for this example. The following policies with asso-
ciated exit policies at each stage are also optimal: (i) (B1,C 1,B 2,C 2,B 3) (ii) (B1,C 1,C 2,B 2,B 3)
(iii) (C1,B 1,B 2,B 3,C 2) (iv) (C1,B 1,B 2,C 2,B 3) (v) (B1,C 1,B 2,B 3,C 2).
It may be interesting to note that none of these optimal policies are ‘lumpy’ i.e. it is not the
case that the attempts on any question are bunched together.4 To demonstrate a failure of the
order-invariance property, let us consider the policy (C1,C 2,B 1,B 2,B 3) (with optimal exit policies
at each stage) which has the same number of attempts on each question as the optimal policy Popt,
but diﬀers in the order of the attempts. The value from this policy is 0.92298, which is clearly less
than that from Popt.
To understand better the counter example, it may be useful to compute the optimal exit policies
in this case. These are: E1 =( B1,A 1,A 2,A 3),E 2 =( B1,B 2,B 3),E 3 =( A1,A 2),E 4 =( A1); this
policy is shown in ﬁgure 3. The important diﬀerence with the optimal policy Popt occurs for the
exit policy E2. If the ﬁrst success occurs in period 2, and one has only attempted question C so
4Hence, even to determine the best policy involving a given number of attempts on each question, it is not suﬃcient
to compare only (the relatively small number of) policies with various permutations of ‘bunches of attempts’ on each
question.
20far, the distribution on A and B is unchanged. With only three periods left, the distribution on
B is better, and the optimal course of action from this state onward is “attempt B until success”.
In the optimal policy shown in ﬁgure 2, success in period 2 leaves questions A and C unanswered
(having already attempted C1 and failed). Now the distribution on A contains a relative gem at
hA
3 =0 .2 which is only attainable in three periods; hence the optimal policy from this stage on is to
attempt A in all the subsequent periods. If however, one did not ﬁnd success in period 2, it would
not be favorable to go for this gem, as the combined distributions on B and C are more favorable.
Thus, the exit policy depends quite non-trivially on the question that one is exiting through. It is
this feature that plays an important role in the failure of the invariance principle in the case with
more than two questions.
If the exam consists only of two questions, the invariance principle (Proposition 1) applies. This
means that, at worst, the candidate need only to compute the values V (0),V(1),.. ...,V(T),a n d
then seek the maximum amongst them. Without this simplifying feature in the optimal policy, how
complex is it when the number of questions exceeds two? With regard to our model, we can show
that for the set of exams with a ﬁxed number of questions n, the optimal search policy for a deadline
T can be computed in a number of steps bounded by a polynomial in T of degree n +1 . But now
as the number of questions n increases, the degree of the polynomial also grows. The algorithmic
complexity of the general optimization problem is likely to be even higher; the computation time
may grow exponentially with n, the number of exam questions.
5.2 An extension
In this section, we consider a variant to the model discussed so far. We shall show that for this
variant, the order invariance principle holds for any number of questions. In the above model, the
candidate’s objective was to maximize her expected total score from the exam. Suppose instead,
the candidate is interested in correctly answering only one of the questions. Thus she seeks to
maximize the probability of answering one question.
When rewards on all the questions are equal, the logic of the invariance principle applies here
too. On the margin, a change in the order of attempts AiBj to BjAi will not alter the probability
of being able to answer one question. For instance, suppose Ai is the right answer for question A,
21while Bj is not the correct one for B; then either policy will uncover the right answer.
In fact, under this new objective function, the invariance principle not only holds for two
questions, but for any number of questions as well. As we saw in the counter-example 1 in the
previous section, it was the diﬀerence in value of diﬀerent follow-up policies after success on one
of the questions that caused breakdown of the invariance principle. However, in the case when the
candidate seeks to answer only one of the questions correctly, this issue does not arise. Hence the
validity of the invariance principle holds for any number of questions in this variant of the model.
Consequently, ﬁnding the optimal policy here is much simpler and the analysis is analogous to that
for the case of two questions in the original model.











Now, the marginal value from increasing the attempts on A from m to m +1is given by:
W(m +1 )− W(m)=am+1(1 −
T−(m+1) X
j=1




which is identical to the expression for the marginal eﬀect (4) in the earlier case. This similarity
is intuitive: any change in value from increasing the attempts on question A can only occur from
those states of nature in which only one of the two questions are answered correctly by either
policy. Hence, the marginal eﬀect must be the same whether one is interested in answering only
one question or both.
Thus, the analysis in this variant is identical to that for the earlier model. Unlike the previous
case, however, here the analysis is also simple when the number of questions is greater than two.
In particular, an optimal policy is completely speciﬁed by the number of attempts it allocates to
each question; the order in which they appear do not matter.
5.3 Discussion
Although our analysis in this paper has been primarily decision-theoretic, we can suggest some
real-life situations in which the model may be applicable, and where its behavioral implications are
economically relevant.
22Consider for example, a government that is interested in leaving a legacy, establishing a rep-
utation for being a “doer”, or simply in getting re-elected. It will typically have a ﬁnite horizon
over which to achieve its goal, usually until the next election. Now, the government may choose
to leave its mark on any of a possible number of areas. Suppose for example, health-care, solving
an insurgency problem and developmental work are three important problems facing the country
and in each year of governance, the government is able to focus its energy on any one of them.
With subjective beliefs about its ability to solve any or all of these three problems, the decision
problem facing the government is akin to the model in the paper. Changes in the deadline, as
given by the length of an electoral cycle, may lead to drastic diﬀerences in the policies that get
implemented. Similarly, the length of time before a ﬁrm’s patent on a product runs out maybe
crucial in determining the research strategy that it will adopt.
Deadlines are also encountered within organizations. Projects in ﬁrms often have to be com-
pleted within given time limits. In recent times, one of the biggest deadlines that ﬁrms have had to
face is the Year 2000 (Y2K) problem. This was a universal deadline, imposed externally, and quite
infrangible. For a ﬁrm needing to eliminate the Y2K bug from a number of diﬀerent applications,
the optimal priority with which to proceed is an important decision and would depend on the values
of these applications as well as on the probabilities of being able to ﬁx the bug(s) in any or all of
them within the deadline. It may also have to decide whether to employ separate employees on the
various projects or to employ the same employee to search through the diﬀerent applications, one
at a time. This resource-allocation problem can be addressed by a variant of our basic model.
Consider the behavior of unemployed job seekers in labor markets. In this context, the duration
of unemployment beneﬁts has been a widely debated policy issue. It is believed to have important
impacts on unemployment rates, on social welfare, and on labor movement across sectors and
regions. Search models with deadlines, as the one we have studied in this paper, may be helpful
in understanding some of these phenomena by explaining how deadlines may aﬀect the decisions
of workers to switch between sectors in searching for jobs. If workers’ beliefs about the chance
of ﬁnding a job in their ‘parent’ sector diﬀer from their belief about ﬁnding employment in other
sectors, the deadline imposed by the expiry of unemployment beneﬁts is likely to aﬀect their sectoral
search behavior, and consequently their overall probability of leaving unemployment.
23Going beyond single-agent decision problems, one may also consider the eﬀects of deadlines
when agents strategically interact. On this front, several authors have studied the theory of bar-
gaining when deadlines are introduced. See for example, Fershtman and Seidmann (1993), Ma and
Manove (1993). There the main emphasis has been how deadlines can aﬀect the delay in reaching
agreement. While conﬁrming the general point that behavior is sensitive to deadlines, the strategic
eﬀects exploited in these models are quite diﬀerent from ours. As we have already noted in the
Introduction, while deadlines are a ubiquitous fact of life, the economic reasons behind why and
how they are set remain largely unexplored. One paper that attempts to explain how a deadline
may arise endogenously in a principal-agent framework is O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). If the
agent has a propensity to procrastinate, and the principal suﬀers from delay, then they show that
the solution may take the form of an incentive contract involving deadlines (in a generalized sense).
In this paper, we have characterized optimal behavior in a multi-dimensional search framework
with deadlines and have shown that behavior can be extremely sensitive to changes in the deadline,
even under very long deadlines. Furthermore, it can be sensitive in a way that cannot be explained
merely as changes in impatience (or more precisely, impatience modelled as geometric discounting.)
One may also ask: if a principal were to impose a deadline on an agent, how should the optimal
deadline depend on the principal’s objective? For example, for an examiner designing an exam that
best elicits the candidate’s knowledge, as against an employer wishing to maximize the expected
return of the employee’s eﬀorts, we suspect that the deadlines involved in the two cases would be
rather diﬀerent. These and other issues remain in an understanding of the behavioral and welfare
implications of deadlines, and promisest ob eaf e r t i l ea r e ao ff u t u r er e s e a r c h .
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7 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . If the deadline is T =1 , there is nothing to prove; thus we assume
T ≥ 2. Consider all policies P which involve n attempts on question A. Let us denote the pair of
true answers to the two questions as (Ai,B j). There are four possibilities: (i) if (Ai,B j) lie in the
region i + j ≤ T , then all policies would lead to success in both questions and realize the value
α + β. (ii) if the pair of true answers lie in the region i>nand j>T− n, then all policies in P
will see n (unsuccessful) attempts on A and T −n (unsuccessful) attempts on B; none will lead to
success in either question and so the realized value is 0. (iii) suppose i ≤ n while j>T− i;n o w ,
all policies in P lead to success in A but failure in B and the realized value is α. (iv) similarly if
j ≤ T − n and i>T− j,a l lP policies realize the value β. We have thus shown that all policies
involving n attempts on A (irrespective of the order of the attempts) produce the same outcome,
and a fortiori the same value, in every possible state. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Without loss of generality let us assume that fA(1) = 1. We further
assume that there does not exist a time-period T∗ such that fA(T)=0for all T>T ∗. As will
become clear, the construction below can be easily modiﬁed to rationalize such a function.
We will now use the following program to construct recursively the g-functions for A and B.
Take s ∈ (0,1/2) and ε>0 such that 2(1 + ε) < 1/s.
Start with gA(1) = s2,g B(1) = s, and initialize two artiﬁcial variables j =2 , “regime A”=1 .
For t =2to ∞, do the following recursively:
if fA(t)=t,
(i) if regime A =1 , increment j by 1; deﬁne gA(t)=gB(t)=sj; leave “regime A” unchanged.
25(ii) if regime A 6=1 , then set regime A =1 , deﬁne gA(t)=sj+2,g B(t)=( 1+ε)sj+1, and
increment j by 2.
else, if fA(t)=0 ,
(i) if regime A =0 , increment j by 1; deﬁne gA(t)=gB(t)=sj; leave “regime A” unchanged.
(ii) if regime A 6=0 , then set regime A =0 , deﬁne gA(t)=( 1+ε)sj+1,g B(t)=sj+2, and
increment j by 2.
First, we need to verify that what we have constructed are valid probability distributions and
secondly that the corresponding probabilities i.e. {ai}∞
i=1 and {bi}∞
i=1 are non-decreasing. Using
the reciprocal relation (2), we can reformulate the condition of non-increasing probabilities i.e.
ai ≥ ai+1 in terms of gA
i as: gA




By our choice of s and ε, we have 2 − 1
(1+ε)sn < 0 for all n ≥ 1; since gA(t) is of the form Ksm






i=1 ai. Since in our construction,
Qn
i=1 gA





i=1 ai =1 , and therefore {ai}∞
i=1 is a valid probability distribution. A
similar logic also applies to {bi}∞
i=1.









i+1 > 1 − gA
i+1 = hA
i ; similarly
for B] hence by proposition 3, the optimal policy will generally involve attempts on only A or only
on B depending on whether
QT
i=1 gA
i is smaller (bigger) than
QT
i=1 gB
i . The construction is such







i are equal. An extra (1 + ε) term is introduced into gA(T) to
make the former product bigger and thus get “all B” to be optimal under a deadline of T.







is s<1, and thus “all A” is optimal as required; when regime A =0( t h i si sw h e nfA(t)=0 )the
same ratio is 1+ε, and then “all B”i so p t i m a l . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Without loss of generality let us assume that fA(1) = 1.
Deﬁne the increasing sequence xn = s −  n with 0 < <1
2 and   + 1
2 <s<1.
We will now use the following program to construct recursively the g-functions for A and B.
26Start with gA(t)=gB(t)=s for all t, and initialize four artiﬁcial variables j =1 ,n A =1 ,
nB =0 , “regime A”=1 . Redeﬁne gA(nA)=x1.
For t =2to ∞, do the following recursively:
if fA(t)=fA(t − 1),
(i) increment nB by 1
(ii) if regime A =1 , then set regime A =0and increment j by 1
(iii) redeﬁne gB(nB)=xj.
else, if fA(t) 6= fA(t − 1),
(i) increment nA by 1
(ii) if regime A 6=1 , then set regime A =1and increment j by 1
(iii) redeﬁne gA(nA)=xj.





i=1 ai. Since in our construction
Qn
i=1 gA
i is the product of xi’s (which are each less
than 1), this implies that
Q∞
i=1 gA
i =0 , i.e.
P∞
i=1 ai =1 . Therefore {ai}∞
i=1 is a valid probability
distribution. A similar logic also applies to {bi}∞
i=1. To check that the constructed probabilities
are non-increasing, the g-functions must satisfy the condition gA
i+1 ≥ 2 − 1
gA
i
. Now, according to
the construction gA(n)=xk and gA(n +1 )=xm for some k and m with m ≥ k. Since xj is an
increasing sequence, xm ≥ xk > 2xk−1
xk and thus the above condition is satisﬁed.
Recall from proposition 3 that the optimal policy of m attempts on question A in an exam






i . Now, by construction, the hazard rates on both
questions are decreasing [here either gA
i+1 = gA
i , or gA
i = xj and gA







i ; similarly for B]; hence the optimal policy
will generally involve non-zero attempts on both questions. From (6), the optimal number of
attempts is given by m such that hA
m − hB
T−m+1 > 0 and hA
m+1 − hB
T−m < 0. By construction, this
occurs at m = fA(T). ¥
27